

**BEFORE THE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL APPEALS BOARD
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

AB-8569

File: 21-380263 Reg: 05059480

FORTUNE FOODS INCORPORATED, dba Seafood City Supermarket
8231 Woodman Avenue, Panorama City, CA 91402,
Appellant/Licensee

v.

DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL,
Respondent

Administrative Law Judge at the Dept. Hearing: Ronald M. Gruen

Appeals Board Hearing: March 1, 2007
Los Angeles, CA

ISSUED MAY 9, 2007

Fortune Foods Incorporated, doing business as Seafood City Supermarket (appellant), appeals from a decision of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control¹ which suspended its license for 15 days for its clerk selling an alcoholic beverage to a police minor decoy, a violation of Business and Professions Code section 25658, subdivision (a).

Appearances on appeal include appellant Fortune Foods Incorporated, appearing through its counsel, Ralph B. Saltsman, Stephen W. Solomon, and Michael Akopyan, and the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, appearing through its counsel, David W. Sakamoto.

¹The decision of the Department, dated May 25, 2006, is set forth in the appendix.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant's off-sale general license was issued on December 5, 2001. On April 26, 2005, the Department filed an accusation against appellant charging the sale of an alcoholic beverage to a minor. The minor, 19-year-old Ezequiel Arizmendi, was working as a minor decoy for the Los Angeles Police Department at the time.

At the administrative hearing held on March 9, 2006, documentary evidence was received and testimony was presented concerning the sale. Subsequent to the hearing, the Department issued its decision which determined that the violation charged was proved and no defense was established. Appellant filed an appeal contending that the Department violated due process and the Administrative Procedure Act by making an ex parte communication and violated appellant's right to discovery.

DISCUSSION

I

Appellant contends the Department violated due process and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (Gov. Code, § 11340 et seq.) by transmitting a report of hearing, prepared by the Department's advocate at the administrative hearing, to the Department's decision maker after the hearing but before the Department issued its decision, and by failing to create an adequate screening procedure to prevent the Department's decision maker from "possessing and considering" the report of hearing.

Appellant argues that when a party or its advocate violates the prohibition in the APA against ex parte communication with the ultimate decision maker, it is, ipso facto, a violation of due process. Due process was also violated, according to appellant, because the Department's attorney assumed the roles of both advocate and advisor to the decision maker.

We agree with appellant that transmission of a report of hearing to the Department's decision maker is a violation of the APA. (*Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd.* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 1 [145 P.3d 462, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 585] (*Quintanar*)). As for appellant's argument that this also violates due process, it is not necessary to decide that question to resolve this appeal. As did the Supreme Court in *Quintanar*,² we decline to address this contention.

Appellant also contends that the Department's failure to create an effective screen between its advocate and its ultimate decision maker is a violation of due process and the APA. The Second District Court of Appeal, Division Seven, when the *Quintanar* case was before it, ordered the Department to institute a procedure to screen its decision maker from its hearing advocates and banned the use of hearing reports entirely. However, the Supreme Court rejected this as unnecessary in *Quintanar* (40 Cal.4th at p. 17):

We note, however, that the further remedy ordered by the Court of Appeal--mandatory screening procedures barring prosecutor-decision maker contacts and precluding use of reports of hearing in future cases--is overbroad. The APA bars only advocate-decision maker ex parte contacts, not all contacts. Thus, for example, nothing in the APA precludes the ultimate decision maker from considering posthearing briefs submitted by, and served on, each side. The Department if it so chooses may continue to use the report of hearing procedure, so long as it provides licensees a copy of the report and the opportunity to respond. (Cf. § 11430.50 [contacts with presiding officer or decision maker must be public, and all parties must be afforded opportunity to respond].)

² In footnote 13 (*Quintanar, supra*, 40 Cal.4th at p. 17), the court said:

Because limited internal separation of functions is required as a statutory matter, we need not consider whether it is also required by due process. As a prudential matter, we routinely decline to address constitutional questions when it is unnecessary to reach them. [Citations.] Consequently, we express no opinion concerning how the requirements of due process might apply here.

In *Quintanar*, the Department conceded that a report of hearing was prepared and that the decision maker or the decision maker's advisor had access to the report of hearing, establishing, the court held, "that the reports of hearing were provided to the agency's decision maker." (*Id.* at pp. 15-16.) In the present case, no concession similar to that in *Quintanar* has been made by the Department.

Whether a report was prepared and whether the decision maker or his advisors had access to the report are questions of fact. This Board has neither the facilities nor the authority to take evidence and make factual findings. In cases where the Board finds that there is relevant evidence that could not have been produced at the hearing before the Department, it is authorized to remand the matter to the Department for reconsideration in light of that evidence. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 23085.)

In the present case, evidence of the alleged violation by the Department could not have been presented at the administrative hearing because, if it occurred, it occurred *after* the hearing. Evidence regarding any report of hearing in this particular case is clearly relevant to the question of whether the Department proceeded in the manner required by law. We conclude that this matter must be remanded to the Department for a full evidentiary hearing so that the facts regarding the existence and disposition of any such report may be determined.³

³The Department has suggested that, if the matter is remanded, the Board should simply order the parties to submit declarations regarding the facts. This, we believe, would be wholly inadequate. In order to ensure due process to both parties on remand, there must be provision for cross-examination.

The hearing on remand will necessarily involve evidence presented by various administrators, attorneys, and other employees of the Department. While we do not question the impartiality of the Department's own administrative law judges, we cannot think of a better way for the Department to avoid the possibility of the appearance of bias in these hearings than to have them conducted by administrative law judges from the independent Office of Administrative Hearings. This Board cannot, of course, require the Department to do so, but we offer this suggestion in the good faith belief that it would ease the procedural and logistical difficulties for all parties involved.

II

Appellant asserts in its brief that the denial of its pre-hearing motion to compel discovery was improper and denied it the opportunity to defend this action. Its motion was brought in response to the Department's failure to comply with those parts of its discovery request that sought "any findings by the Administrative Law Judge or the Department of ABC that the decoy does not appear to be a person reasonable [*sic*] expected to be under 21 years of age" and all decisions certified by the Department over a four-year period "where there is therein a finding or an effective determination that the decoy at issue therein did not display the appearance which could generally be expected of a person under 21 years of age under the actual circumstances presented the seller of alcoholic beverages at the time of the alleged offense."

Administrative law judge (ALJ) Gruen, who heard the motion, denied it because he concluded it would cause the Department an undue burden and consumption of time and because appellant failed to show that the requested items were relevant or would lead to admissible evidence. Appellant argues that the items requested are expressly included as discoverable matters in the APA and the ALJ used erroneous standards in denying the motion.

"[T]he exclusive right to and method of discovery as to any proceeding governed by [the APA]" is provided in section 11507.6. (Gov. Code, § 11507.5.) The plain meaning of this is that any right to discovery that appellant may have in an administrative proceeding before the Department must fall within the list of specific items found in Government Code section 11507.6. Appellant asserts that the items requested are discoverable under the provisions of subdivisions (b), (d), and (e) of section 11507.6. Those paragraphs provide that a party "is entitled to . . . inspect and make copies of . . . :"

[¶] . . . [¶]

(b) A statement pertaining to the subject matter of the proceeding made by any party to another party or person;

[¶] . . . [¶]

(d) All writings, including, but not limited to, reports of mental, physical and blood examinations and things which the party then proposes to offer in evidence;

(e) Any other writing or thing which is relevant and which would be admissible in evidence; . . .

Appellant argues it is entitled to the materials sought because previous findings by the Department are "statements" made by a party "pertaining to the subject matter of the proceeding," findings made by an ALJ are relevant "writings" that would be admissible as evidence, and the photographs are "writings" that appellant would offer as evidence so the ALJ could compare them to the decoy present at the hearing.

Appellant argues the material requested would help it prepare a defense under rule 141(b)(2) (4 Cal. Code Regs., § 141, subd. (b)(2)) by knowing what criteria have been considered by ALJ's and the Department when deciding that a decoy's appearance violated the rule. It would then be able, it asserts, to compare the appearance of the decoy who purchased alcohol at its premises with the appearance of other decoys who were found not to comply with rule 141(b)(2).

It is conceivable that each decoy who was found not to display the appearance required by the rule had some particular attribute, or combination of attributes, that warranted his or her disqualification. We have considerable doubt, however, that any such attributes, which an ALJ would only be able to examine from a photograph or written description, would be of any assistance in assessing the appearance of a different decoy who is present at the administrative hearing.⁴

⁴ In all cases charging sale-to-minor violations the Department must produce the minor involved unless the minor is deceased or too ill to be present, or the minor's presence is waived by the respondent. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25666.)

The most important attribute at the time of the sale is probably the decoy's facial countenance, since that is the feature that confronts the clerk more than any other. Yet, in every case it is an ALJ's assessment of a decoy's overall appearance that matters, not simply a focus on some narrow aspect of that appearance.

We know from our own experience that appellant's attorneys represent well over half of all appeals this Board hears. We must assume, therefore, that the vast bulk of the information appellant seeks is already in the possession of its attorneys. This, coupled with the questionable assistance this information could provide to an ALJ in assessing the appearance of a decoy present at the hearing, persuades us that ALJ Gruen did not abuse his discretion in denying appellant's motion.

We are unwilling to agree with appellant's contention that the language of Government Code section 11507.6 is broad enough to reach findings and decisions of the Department in past cases. The terms "statements" and "writings" as used in that section cannot reasonably be interpreted to reach any and every finding and decision of the Department. A more reasonable understanding of the terms is that they refer to statements or writings made by a party with respect to the particular subject matter of the proceeding in which the discovery is sought. To interpret the terms to include any finding or decision by the Department in previous cases over a period of years which contained an issue similar to the one in the case being litigated would countenance the worst kind of fishing expedition and would unnecessarily and unduly complicate and protract any proceeding.

Appellant has cited no authority for its contention, and we are unaware of any such authority. Appellant would have this Board afford it the broad discovery that is

available in civil cases, well beyond what is authorized by section 11507.6. We are not permitted to do so.

Appellant also contends that the APA allows denial of a motion to compel discovery only in the cases of privileged communications or when the respondent party lacks possession, custody, or control over the material. Therefore, it argues, denying the motion because the request was burdensome, would require an undue consumption of time, was not relevant, and would not lead to admissible evidence, was clearly in contravention of the APA discovery provisions.

Appellant's contention is based on the false premise stated in its brief (*italicized below*):

In the present case, the ALJ denied Appellant's request for discovery on grounds not contemplated by Gov. Code §§ 11507.6 and 11507.7. Those two Government Code Sections provide the "exclusive right to and method of discovery," Gov. Code § 11507.5, *and similarly state the objections upon which the Department may argue and an ALJ may rely upon in deciding a Motion to Compel. See Gov. Code §§11507.6 & 11507.7.*

This premise is false because it assumes, without any authority, that the two statutes state the sole bases on which a motion to compel may be denied. No such restriction appears in the statutes. The reasons given by the ALJ for denying the motion were well within his authority. Those reasons also provided a reasonable basis for the outright denial of the motion instead of simply limiting the scope of the discovery.

ORDER

The decision of the Department is affirmed as to all issues raised other than that regarding the allegation of an ex parte communication in the form of a Report of

Hearing, and the matter is remanded to the Department for an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the foregoing opinion.⁵

FRED ARMENDARIZ, CHAIRMAN
SOPHIE C. WONG, MEMBER
TINA FRANK, MEMBER
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL
APPEALS BOARD

⁵This order of remand is filed in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 23085, and does not constitute a final order within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 23089.