

**BEFORE THE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL APPEALS BOARD  
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

**AB-8464**

File: 20-401808 Reg: 05058965

7-ELEVEN, INC., and DHRU ENTERPRISES, INC.  
dba 7-Eleven Store No. 2131-25085  
895 Broadway, El Cajon, CA 92021,  
Appellants/Licensees

v.

DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL,  
Respondent

Administrative Law Judge at the Dept. Hearing: Rodolfo Echeverria

Appeals Board Hearing: June 1, 2006  
Los Angeles, CA

**ISSUED OCTOBER 4, 2006**

7-Eleven, Inc., and Dhru Enterprises, Inc., doing business as 7-Eleven Store No. 2131-25085 (appellants), appeal from a decision of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control<sup>1</sup> which suspended their license for 15 days for their clerk, Roxanne Breyman, having sold a 24-ounce can of Coors Light beer to Mariah Kraft, an 18-year-old police minor decoy, a violation of Business and Professions Code section 25658, subdivision (a).

Appearances on appeal include appellants 7-Eleven, Inc., and Dhru Enterprises, Inc., appearing through their counsel, Ralph B. Saltsman, Stephen W. Solomon, and D. Justin Harelik, and the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, appearing through its counsel, Kerry Winters.

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<sup>1</sup>The decision of the Department, dated August 4, 2005, is set forth in the appendix.

## FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellants' off-sale beer and wine license was issued on August 18, 2003. Thereafter, the Department instituted an accusation against appellants on February 18, 2005, charging the sale of beer to a minor on November 19, 2004.

An administrative hearing was held on June 7, 2005, at which time oral and documentary evidence was received. At that hearing, the evidence established that the minor, when asked for identification, provided her California driver's license which showed her true age and carried a red stripe with the phrase "21 in 2007" in large white letters. The clerk made the sale, the decoy left the store, then returned and identified the clerk as the person who sold her the beer. Subsequent to the hearing, the Department issued its decision which determined that the violation had occurred as alleged in the accusation, and appellants had not established any affirmative defense.

Appellants have filed a timely appeal, and raise the following issues: (1) the decoy operation was conducted in an unfair manner; (2) appellants' motion to compel discovery was improperly denied; and (3) appellants were denied due process.

I

Appellants contend that the decoy operation did not comply with the requirement of Rule 141 that it be conducted in a manner which promotes fairness. They point to the decoy's testimony that the clerk stated to her, just before going ahead with the sale, "You scare me," and the police officer's testimony that the clerk told him she was frightened when she saw him looking in the window. Appellants claim that, upon hearing the clerk's statement, the decoy should have aborted the decoy operation.

The clerk did not testify. Hence, there is no direct evidence to support appellants' claim that the clerk would not have made the sale but for having been

frightened by what she saw.

The police officer testified that the clerk told him she thought he might be an undercover officer, but was not concerned he might be a “bad guy.” She told him she just did not check the calendar well.

The clerk, even if frightened, was under no compulsion to go forward with the transaction. The decoy had done nothing improper, and there was no attempt either by her or the police officer to take advantage of the clerk’s supposed fear.

Whatever fear or confusion the clerk may have experienced was self-generated, and its presence did not render the decoy operation unfair.

## II

Appellants assert in their brief that their pre-hearing motion seeking discovery of all decisions certified by the Department over a four-year period “where there is therein a finding or an effective determination that the decoy at issue therein did not display the appearance which could generally be expected of a person under 21 years of age under the actual circumstances presented to the seller of alcoholic beverages at the time of the alleged offense,” was improperly denied. Appellants allege that Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Gruen, who heard the motion, denied it because he concluded it would cause the Department an undue burden and consumption of time and because appellants failed to show that the requested items were relevant or would lead to admissible evidence.

Appellants spend much of their brief arguing that the provisions of the Civil Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016-2036) apply to administrative proceedings, a contention this Board rejected in numerous cases in 1999 and 2000 (see, e.g., *The Southland Corporation/Rogers* (2000) AB-7030a), all of which were argued by the same

law firm representing the present appellants. Those decisions of the Appeals Board held:

“[T]he exclusive right to and method of discovery as to any proceeding governed by [the APA]” is provided in §11507.6. (Gov. Code, §11507.5.) The plain meaning of this is that any right to discovery that appellants may have in an administrative proceeding before the Department must fall within the list of specific items found in Government Code §11507.6, not in the Civil Discovery Act. . . . [¶] In addition, §11507.7 requires that a motion to compel discovery pursuant to §11507.6 “shall state . . . the reason or reasons why the matter is discoverable *under that section* . . . .” [Emphasis added.] [¶] Therefore, we believe that appellants are limited in their discovery request to those items that they can show fall clearly within the provisions of §11507.6.

Appellants’ arguments in the present appeal, repeating, almost verbatim, the arguments made in 1999 and 2000, are no more persuasive today than they were six or seven years ago.

Appellants argue they are entitled to the materials sought because they will help them “prepare its [sic] defense by knowing . . . what factors have been considered by the Department in deciding how a decoy’s appearance violated the rule” (App. Br. at p.14) so that they can compare the appearance of the decoy who purchased alcohol at their premises with the “characteristics, features and factors which have been shown in the past to be inconsistent with the general expectations . . . of the rule.” (App. Br. at p. 13.) They assert “it is more than reasonable” that decisions in which decoys were found not to comply with rule 141(b)(2) “could assist the ALJ in this case by comparison.” (*Ibid.*) However, appellants do not explain how an ALJ is expected to make such a comparison.

It is conceivable that each decoy found not to display the appearance required by the rule had some particular indicium, or combination of indicia, of age that warranted his or her disqualification. We have considerable doubt, however, that any

such indicia, which an ALJ would only be able to examine from a photograph or written description, would be of any assistance in assessing the appearance of a different decoy who is present at an administrative hearing.

The most important indicium at the time of the sale is probably the decoy's facial countenance, since that is the feature that confronts the clerk more than any other. Yet, it is, in every case, an ALJ's overall assessment of a decoy's appearance that matters, not simply a focus on some narrow aspect of a decoy's appearance.

We know from our own experience that appellants' attorneys represent well over half of all appellants before this Board. We would think, therefore, that the vast bulk of the information appellants seek is already in the possession of their attorneys, a fact of which the Board can take official notice. This, coupled with the questionable assistance the information sought could provide to an ALJ in assessing the appearance of a decoy present at the hearing,<sup>2</sup> persuades us that ALJ Gruen did not abuse his discretion in denying appellants' motion.

### III

Appellants assert the Department violated their right to procedural due process when the attorney representing the Department at the hearing before the ALJ provided a document called a Report of Hearing (the report) to the Department's decision maker (or the decision maker's advisor) after the hearing, but before the Department issued its decision. Appellants also filed a Motion to Augment Record (the motion), requesting that the report provided to the Department's decision maker be made part of the record.

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<sup>2</sup> Unless a minor is deceased or too ill to be present, or unless the minor's presence is waived, he or she must be produced at the hearing by the Department in all cases charging violations of Business and Professions Code sections 25658, 25663, and 25665. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, §25666.)

The Appeals Board discussed these issues at some length, and reversed the Department's decisions, in three appeals in which the appellants filed motions and alleged due process violations virtually identical to the motions and issues raised in the present case: *Quintanar* (AB-8099), *KV Mart* (AB-8121), and *Kim* (AB-8148), all issued in August 2004 (referred to in this decision collectively as "*Quintanar*" or "the *Quintanar* cases").<sup>3</sup>

The Board held that the Department violated due process by not separating and screening the prosecuting attorneys from any Department attorney, such as the chief counsel, who acted as the decision maker or advisor to the decision maker. A specific instance of the due process violation occurs when the Department's prosecuting attorney acts as an advisor to the Department's decision maker by providing the report before the Department's decision is made.

The Board's decision that a due process violation occurred was based primarily on appellate court decisions in *Howitt v. Superior Court* (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1575 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 196] (*Howitt*) and *Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills* (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 81 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 234], which held that overlapping, or "conflating," the roles of advocate and decision maker violates due process by depriving a litigant of his or her right to an objective and unbiased decision maker, or at the very least, creating

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<sup>3</sup> The Department filed petitions for review with the Second District Court of Appeal in each of these cases. The cases were consolidated and the court affirmed the Board's decisions. In response to the Department's petition for rehearing, the court modified its opinion and denied rehearing. The cases are now pending in the California Supreme Court and, pursuant to Rule of Court 976, are not citable. (*Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd.* (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 615, review granted July 13, 2005, S133331.)

"the substantial risk that the advice given to the decision maker, 'perhaps unconsciously' . . . will be skewed." (*Howitt, supra*, at p. 1585.)

Although the legal issue in the present appeal is the same as that in the *Quintanar* cases, there is a factual difference that we believe requires a different result. In each of the three cases involved in *Quintanar*, the ALJ had submitted a proposed decision to the Department that dismissed the accusation. In each case, the Department rejected the ALJ's proposed decision and issued its own decision with new findings and determinations, imposing suspensions in all three cases. In the present appeal, however, the Department adopted the proposed decision of the ALJ in its entirety, without additions or changes.

Where, as here, there has been no change in the proposed decision of the ALJ, we cannot say, without more, that there has been a violation of due process. Any communication between the advocate and the advisor or the decision maker after the hearing did not affect the due process accorded appellants at the hearing. Appellants have not alleged that the proposed decision of the ALJ, which the Department adopted as its own, was affected by any post-hearing occurrence. If the ALJ was an impartial adjudicator (and appellants have not argued to the contrary), and it was the ALJ's decision alone that determined whether the accusation would be sustained and what discipline, if any, should be imposed upon appellants, it appears to us that appellants received the process that was due them in this administrative proceeding. Under these circumstances, and with the potential of an inordinate number of cases in which this due process argument could possibly be asserted, this Board cannot expand the

holding in *Quintanar* beyond its own factual situation.<sup>4</sup>

Under the circumstances of this case and our disposition of the due process issue raised, appellants are not entitled to augmentation of the record. With no change in the ALJ's proposed decision upon its adoption by the Department, we see no relevant purpose that would be served by the production of any post-hearing document. Appellants' motion is denied.

#### ORDER

The decision of the Department is affirmed.<sup>5</sup>

FRED ARMENDARIZ, CHAIRMAN  
SOPHIE C. WONG, MEMBER  
TINA FRANK, MEMBER  
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL  
APPEALS BOARD

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<sup>4</sup> The Department has filed a declaration of John R. Peirce, Chief Counsel of the Department, in which he describes a screening procedure he established to prevent the report of hearing from being seen by the Department's decision maker. Appellants have challenged the declaration as failing to meet critical aspects of their claims. In view of our disposition of this matter, we do not find it necessary to resolve this dispute.

<sup>5</sup> This final decision is filed in accordance with Business and Professions Code §23088 and shall become effective 30 days following the date of the filing of this final decision as provided by §23090.7 of said code.

Any party may, before this final decision becomes effective, apply to the appropriate district court of appeal, or the California Supreme Court, for a writ of review of this final decision in accordance with Business and Professions Code §23090 et seq.